America is a Christian Version of Iran

This country is so hopeless.

Apparently we have always been this way. If there is any evidence that we any more sane on religious/science type questions than we are now, would someone please present it to me? I do not believe we have grown more fundamentalist in the last 40 years. The US has always been an extremely fundamentalist country. Like I said, if you have some evidence that we were even less nuts on religious questions than we are today, let me see the evidence. I would love to see it.

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H. L. Mencken on Problem Solving

For every complex problem, there is a solution that is simple, logical and wrong.

- H. L. Mencken.

Discuss.

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Stop Masturbation Now!

Here.

All right all you guys, stop fapping right this minute! You are all going to break your damn dicks if you keep it up like this.

And ladies, quit rubbin’ the nubbin. It is not very ladylike you know!

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Bigfoot News Birthday Edition Part 2

Shocking news about the Stacy Brown “Bigfoot arm”: A Beyond Highbrow exclusive story!

The official story has already gone out. A possible Bigfoot arm was found on a man’s property in Florida. Stacy Brown’s team went to investigate and took possession of it. The original bone was said to be large and had some hair on it. A FWS biologist was called in, and he verified that it was a primate arm. Brown then issued a statement that they were going to have the arm tested. 11 days later, Brown released a story saying that the arm had been tested and had been proven to be an alligator arm.

Actually, the official story is not true. So what really happened?

Here is what happened.

The arm was found on a law enforcement official’s property in an area of heavy Bigfoot activity. The arm was dug up by a dog and had been worked by animals. The arm had hair on it. A FWS scientist was called in and said the arm was a primate. I know someone who saw the arm with hair on it and was there when the FWS made that determination. In order to believe Stacy Brown’s insane story, we have to believe that a FWS biologist is so stupid that he cannot tell a reptile arm from a mammal arm.

Within one hour after taking possession of the arm, Brown received a phone call from a very wealthy Bigfoot enthusiast in Ohio. He wanted to get involved. Brown said no. The man asked how much would it take you to give up that arm. Brown quoted a very high figure – I can now reveal that that figure was $500,000. The man bit, unbelievably enough. The sale was made immediately, and incredibly, the entire $500K was wired into Stacy’s account, and the arm was in the mail just like that.

Brown then started putting out fake stories about how they were going to test the arm even though they didn’t even have possession of it anymore. Very quickly, Brown called up a taxidermist friend and asked him how much it would cost to buy an alligator arm. The man quoted $600. Brown said fine and bought the reptile arm. They then put out a fake story about the arm being tested and having been proven to have been an alligator, all to cover up the huge amount that Brown made on the sale of the arm. Brown is now, like the man in Ohio, a rich man. He is also a great big liar. On the latter count, in Bigfootery, he has found a happy home.

My source for this information: An anonymous source very close to Beyond Highbrow has revealed this very exclusive information to us. I know him well and believe him implicitly. This man is extremely close to Stacy Brown. He was present when most of the important events in the above story occurred, in other words, this is eyewitness testimony. The source reports that some members of Brown’s team are disgusted and feel that Brown sold out Bigfootery for money. They feel that the arm may have been a real Bigfoot arm, but now it is off to some rich man, and we will never know what it was.

Because my new story will probably be torn to pieces, I will have a question and answer session below.

Where was the arm found? Somewhere in Florida.

Was it found on the property of a credible person? Yes, he is a law enforcement official who wishes to remain anonymous.

Is there activity in the area? Actually, there is a lot of Bigfoot activity in and around that property, including a trackway that was found before the arm.

How was the arm found? It was dug up by a dog.

Does that make sense? Yes, Bigfoots bury their dead.

What shape was it in? The bone had been worked over by animals.

Did it have hair on it? Yes, it had patches of brown hair on it.

Is the arm human? The LE official immediately ruled out human.

What is the arm? It is the arm of a non-human primate.

What did the arm look like? It was large enough that the team thought it could have been a juvenile Sasquatch. It also had a certain amount of hair on it.

Where any photos released? Yes, two photos were released. The first one was said to be the original “primate arm,” and the second one was said to be the same arm after testing proved it was an alligator.

What was in the two photos? Both photos were of the alligator arm that was purchased by Stacy very soon after he acquired the primate arm. So skeptics are correct that that is an alligator arm in the photo, and they are also correct that both photos line up perfectly; indeed they do because they are two photos of the same alligator bone.

This is the original released photo, said to be a Sasquatch arm, was actually a gator arm purchased from a taxidermist.

This is the original released photo, said to be a Sasquatch arm but was actually a gator arm purchased from a taxidermist.

So Stacy lied and knowingly put out a photo of a known alligator bone and claimed it was a photo of the primate bone they found? Apparently this is what occurred.

Is there hair on the bone on either of the photos? Apparently not. What might be hair is just dirt, decomposed flesh or skin.

Was a photo of the actual primate arm ever released? Actually a photo was released! Photos were taken of the primate arm as soon as it was acquired, and one of these photos was uploaded to the site of Brown’s team (The Sasquatch Hunters) immediately. This photo stayed up for only a short time until the arm was sold to the man from Ohio. Then it was quickly taken down and shortly replaced with a photo of the newly acquired gator bone.

What about people who say that both photos line up perfectly so Brown’s story is correct? They are right. Both bones line up. That is because they are two photos of the same gator bone bought from a taxidermist. But that doesn’t prove Brown’s story is correct at all, of course.

This is the second photo of the same gator arm, this time said to be the "primate arm" after it was proven to be a gator. The same purchased gator arm was used for both photos.

This is the second photo of the same gator arm, this time said to be the “primate arm” after it was proven to be a gator. The same purchased gator arm was used for both photos.

Were any photos of the real primate bone taken? Yes, they were. See above.

Did you try to obtain some photos? Yes I did, but they were not available. Stacy has photos of the real bone, but he is keeping all of that very close to his chest.

What does the bone look like to you? I haven’t the faintest idea. I am not an anatomist, and I know nothing of what any sort of bones look like, mammal, reptile or otherwise. Don’t ask me.

Where does that leave us? The real arm is either the arm of an ape or monkey that was running loose in Florida or it is the arm of a Bigfoot.

How could an ape or a monkey be running loose in Florida? Reportedly there are monkeys and possibly even apes running loose in Florida having escaped from collectors and having been freed via recent hurricanes.

Is there any specific evidence that tell us whether the real arm was from  a monkey/ape or a Bigfoot? Not that I am aware of.

Will we ever hear about this primate arm again? Possibly no. The rich man has taken possession of it, and we may never hear of it again.

Why was the rich man so anxious to buy the arm? I have no idea.

How did the rich man figure out so quickly that the arm had been recovered? I have no idea.

Who is the rich man? I wish I knew.

Is Stacy Brown rich? He is now.

Is Stacy Brown a liar? Sure looks like it.

Is Bigfootery about Big Money? It sure can be, no?

Why is this post titled Birthday Edition? Put on your thinking cap.

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Bigfoot News Birthday Edition, 2014

Another Bigfoot body found!? Yes, that is correct. An excellent source has revealed to me that another Bigfoot body, or possibly part of a body, has been obtained somewhere in the United States.* I will hopefully have a lot more information about this shocking news in my next update. I will have more on this soon. The more you bug me about it, the quicker I may write it up. You may ask question about this body or partial body in the comments section. I will try to answer them there or possibly in a new post.

Sorry for not writing. But there really has not been much to write about in Bigfootery. Also I have been very tired. And plus I am sick and tired of all of the dangerous nutcases loose on the Bigfoot scene, a scene that has more frightening kooks in it than most other sociocultural scenes.

Lunatics to emerge. I fully expect the nutcases, mostly deriving from the anti-Dyer** movement (who are mostly quarantined at the moment over at Randy’s blog in order to keep them from infecting the rest of the scene with their deadly and nearly untreatable anti-Dyer virus), to come out in full force to smash down this latest news, just like they always do.

*I actually know a lot more about this than I am letting on here. I am just giving you a tidbit or two.

**And no, this body has nothing at all to do with a lunatic named Rick Dyer, thank God.

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An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance – Tendencies

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for “An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance” a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here . Note that this material is copyrighted and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and just false analysis but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get sort of a “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can kind of sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece. Here is the piece in its entirety:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE: The First Year, March 2003-May 2004

ROBERT LINDSAY

TENDENCIES

*****

Islamists: One study conducted in Summer 2003 found most fighters (~70%) were Sunni and Shia (probably mostly Sunni) Iraqi Arabs with an Islamist background. Many of these are merely pious, mostly Sunni, often tribal, Arabs, who claim to be “fighting for Islam”, but are not necessarily fundamentalists at all. Much has been made in the US media about the influence of Iraqi “Wahhabis”. The situation is highly confused. Iraqi Shiites, and perhaps other Iraqis, routinely refer to conservative Sunnis as Wahhabis, though most of them are not Wahhabis at all.

The ultra-puritanical, intolerant, Taliban/Al-Qaeda/Wahhabi type of Islam favored by many radical fundamentalist Muslims has never been popular in Iraq, a nation that has long-favored a much more cosmopolitan, secular, tolerant brand of Islam.It is this more moderate Iraqi Islam that many of the Islamists seem to be espousing. The Islamists admit to some links with the Saddam loyalists, especially to buy weapons from the loyalists, but other than that, there is not a lot of cooperation. Many Iraqi Islamists have taken a hard line against attacks on Iraqi civilians, saying that they feel attacks should be on military targets only.

They also sometimes take a softer line on the local Iraqi police, saying they are needed to keep the order. The Islamists have harshly condemned most of the attacks on Iraqi infrastructure that the Saddam loyalists have specialized in. However, the Islamist position on attacking the oil-for-export infrastructure is not known.

The Islamists do not feel that attacks that increase the misery of the Iraqi people are helpful or moral. Although the Summer 2003 study above concluded that ~85% of the resistance were Islamists, as of 2-04, a better guess at the percentage of Islamists in the resistance would be ~70%. There is also a harder-line group of Salafist Sunni Islamists in Iraq, but their numbers do not seem to be large. This group espouses radical Sunni Islam, often similar to the AQ line.

*****

Criminals: Some Iraqi resistance fighters are criminals, but not many, and the percentage seems to be dropping fast. Throughout much of 2003, the US military claimed that this group made up a large percentage of fighters, but there was never much evidence for their charge. It would seem that a criminal would not make a very good or reliable soldier. The percentage of criminals is less than 5% of fighters. By 2004, criminals were becoming increasingly negligible in the resistance.

*****

Communists/Leftists/Marxists: One of the largest groupings, the NFLI, seems to have this sort of orientation. The Communist Party has very deep roots in Iraq, and around 1960, it was the most popular party in Iraq. For instance, most of the followers of radical Shia preacher Sadr in the Sadr City slum district of Baghdad were formerly Communists.

A number of Leftist groupings have reportedly taken up arms (see below) but almost nothing is known about their role in the war. The percentage of Leftists in the resistance is not large, no more than 5%. Many of the Islamist groups say they are willing to fight alongside Communist fighters. In various Iraqi resistance groups, Leftists and Communists fight alongside Baathists, nationalists, and Islamists with no problems at all.

*****

Mercenaries: Throughout 2003, the US military continuously alleged that most of the Iraqi resistance was made up of mere mercenaries who in it for the money and cared nothing about the cause. There was never much evidence for this allegation, which always smacked of US military propaganda. By 2004, the US military had abruptly abandoned the notion that most fighters were either criminals or mercenaries or both. The rapidity with which this charge was dropped suggests that there was never much to it anyway.

Objective Iraqi political scientists state that mercenaries do make up some of the Iraqi resistance, but not many. The Islamists, in particular, are typically not paid money to fight. The percentage of mercenaries is less than 5% of fighters. By 2004, mercenaries were becoming increasingly negligible in the resistance. The US military charge that resistance fighters are mere mercenaries is really quite silly and hypocritical in light of the situation with the Coalition and pro-Coalition forces. All Coalition soldiers and all armed Coalition “security contractors” are being paid to fight in Iraq, and in the case of the contractors, the pay is very high.

All Iraqi police and Iraqi ICDC Army are getting paid very good salaries by Iraqi standards to wage war on the resistance. The Coalition is offering fat rewards in return for intelligence about the resistance. In light of the fact that so much of the Coalition and pro-Coalition armed forces are being paid, often quite well, and pro-US spies are also being compensated very well, the charge that Iraqi resistance fighters “are only in it for the money” seems quite hypocritical, to say the least.

****

Saddam Loyalists/Former Regime Loyalists/Baathists/Baath Party/Pro-Saddam elements: About 30%, or 22-30,000 fighters, as of 1-04. In the month or so after Saddam’s capture, this was quite split between anti-Saddam and pro-Saddam Baathists. However, at the moment, most, if not all, members of this group appear to have abandoned both Saddam and the former regime, are no longer fighting to restore the former regime to power, and many are not even fighting to restore the Baath Party to power.

In areas like Samarra, anti-Saddam Baathists are quite prominent and vastly outnumber the pro-Saddam Baathists. More likely to be involved in the top-level (hidden) leadership of some of the groups, and seems to have a significant role in funding.

A number of former Saddam loyalists are present in anti-Saddam groups, but some of those groups have required the loyalists to take a vow to renounce loyalty to Saddam’s regime to do that. A number of the former Saddam Fedayeen were reportedly converted quite quickly to an Islamic orientation by Islamist groups, and became members of those groups.

The theory, parroted by the US and its allies – that the resistance is made up almost exclusively of Saddam loyalists – would appear to have little support. However, they may indeed make up much of the guerrilla leadership, funding, etc. Saddam loyalists have taken a very hard line what are appropriate targets to attack, saying that anyone who cooperates with the Occupation in any way should be attacked.

Many of the more shocking attacks on largely civilian targets, such as on the UN, the ICRC offices, and other humanitarian offices, have been done by Saddam loyalists. They are also behind many of the (non-oil) infrastructure attacks such as attacks on water treatment plants, power lines, water mains, electricity workers, etc. The probable aim here is to make life as miserable as possible for the Iraqis, in hopes they will blame the US and join the rebellion. Saddam is said to have ordered attacks on anything or anyone “making the Occupation comfortable”. Some pro-Saddam fighters are also Islamists and nationalist sentiments are almost universal amongst this faction. The revenge element is also frequently present.

********

Mercenaries: Throughout 2003, the US military continuously alleged that most of the Iraqi resistance was made up of mere mercenaries who in it for the money and cared nothing about the cause. There was never much evidence for this allegation, which always smacked of US military propaganda. By 2004, the US military had abruptly abandoned the notion that most fighters were either criminals or mercenaries or both. The rapidity with which this charge was dropped suggests that there was never much to it anyway.

Objective Iraqi political scientists state that mercenaries do make up some of the Iraqi resistance, but not many. The Islamists, in particular, are typically not paid money to fight. The percentage of mercenaries is less than 5% of fighters. By 2004, mercenaries were becoming increasingly negligible in the resistance. The US military charge that resistance fighters are mere mercenaries is really quite silly and hypocritical in light of the situation with the Coalition and pro-Coalition forces. All Coalition soldiers and all armed Coalition “security contractors” are being paid to fight in Iraq, and in the case of the contractors, the pay is very high.

All Iraqi police and Iraqi ICDC Army are getting paid very good salaries by Iraqi standards to wage war on the resistance. The Coalition is offering fat rewards in return for intelligence about the resistance. In light of the fact that so much of the Coalition and pro-Coalition armed forces are being paid, often quite well, and pro-US spies are also being compensated very well, the charge that Iraqi resistance fighters “are only in it for the money” seems quite hypocritical, to say the least.

****

Christians: A few Iraqi Christians are known to have taken up arms, but most have not. Some have been wounded or killed fighting for the resistance. Almost nothing is known of the Christian role in the resistance. Most of the Iraqi Islamist groups say they are willing to incorporate Christian fighters into their formations.

*****

Turkmen: A few Turkmen are known to have taken up arms, but most have not. Some have been wounded or killed fighting for the resistance. Almost nothing is known of the Turkmen role in the resistance. AAI has some Turkmen members.

*****

Kurds: Only a very few Kurds have taken up arms against the Coalition, and most of those are very hardline Islamists such as AAI. In 12-03, ~25 Kurdish Islamists were arrested in Kirkuk and charged with being insurgents – they were charged with having links to AAI. In 2-04, a hardline Islamist movement was said to be growing in the mountains of Kurdistan, which refused any cooperation with the US. Their views are similar to AAI – for instance, TV’s have been banned. However, it was not known if they were armed. Iraqi resistance spokesmen say that the hardline Islamic stand of these Kurds will need to be moderated if they are to expand their resistance movement much.

****

Women: guerrilas are overwhelmingly men, though Muhammed’ s Army claims an all-female brigade in Diyala Province (which is further evidence against MA being a hardline Islamist grouping). There have been a few female combatants, but not many. There were some notable cases, such as the following:

a. In 6-03, a young Iraqi Shia woman from a Shia village outside Baqubah tried to throw a grenade at US troops in Baqubah and was killed by the troops.
b. In 7-03, an 11-year-old Iraqi girl attacked US troops with an AK-47 in Ramadi and then ran home – troops were so stunned that they did not even fire back at her. The gun was later found hidden in one of her dresses. See Minors below.
c. In 9-03, a 48-year-old Iraqi woman with a suicide bomb belt strapped to her body was captured trying to enter the Finance Ministry in Baghdad.
d. In 11-03, an Iraqi mother and her 3 sons were arrested in Fallujah and charged with planning attacks.
e. In 12-03, a Syrian woman was arrested with a sophisticated timing device in Basra and accused of plotting to bomb the harbor.
f. In 2-04, an Iraqi female suicide bomber, the first in Iraq, approached the home of an Iraqi collaborationist tribal leader and detonated herself outside the home when guards denied her entry. 3 guards were wounded.

*****

Minors: guerrilas are mostly adult males, ranging in age from 18 to ~50. A few minors have waged guerrilla-style anti-US attacks, but not many (see the case of the 11-yr-old girl in Ramadi above). There would seem to be ample supply of able-bodied males ready and able to fight. Minors, including young children, are sometimes used as lookouts, notably in the major battle in Samarra on 11-30-03.

Boys, especially teenage boys, have in some cases engaged in rock-throwing attacks on US troops, but this does not appear to have been common. Rock throwing was most frequently reported in Fallujah and Baghdad. In 12-03, a number of junior high and high-school age boys in the Adhamiya District of Baghdad were taken to jail for throwing rocks at troops in a demonstration.

*****

Former Iraqi military: As most Iraqi males had at least some military service and training, the group of (mostly Sunni) former Iraqi military makes up a very large number of the guerrilas. Although some are fighting for Saddam, many others are not. Those who are not pro-Saddam say they are fighting for nationalism, Islam, tribal honor or getting revenge for various indignities. Many of them either say they have given up on Saddam or describe him as a loser who sold out the country to the invaders.

The fact that most Iraqi males have had military training, plus the fact that most military-age Iraqi males were drafted into the military, at least during the US invasion of 2003, has provided US military propaganda with a veritable propaganda gold mine – now the US can claim that most of the Iraqi resistance is made up of (drum roll): “former members of the Iraqi military”! Well, of course it does, but the Iraqi military, as an institution, dates back decades to the early part of the 20th Century, and has its own ideology, primarily nationalist or Arab nationalist, often independent of whatever regime was in power.

It is this nationalist/Arab nationalist ideology, not loyalty to Saddam’s regime, which best describes the ideology of former Iraqi military, from officers down to cadre. Shia made up the majority of the Iraqi military, so by the logic of US military propaganda, apparently this means most Iraqi Shia supported Saddam! The hard fact is that the obvious observation that most Iraqi guerrilas are former Iraqi military members is both a circular argument and utterly irrelevant in terms of their ideology; and it certainly does not imply that all or even most of said former military members are pro-Saddam or pro-Baath.

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An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance – Foreign Assistance

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for “An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance” a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here . Note that this material is copyrighted and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and just false analysis but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get sort of a “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can kind of sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece. Here is the piece in its entirety:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE: The First Year, March 2003-May 2004

ROBERT LINDSAY

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Syria: Although US propaganda has made much of the Syrian connection to the Iraqi insurgency, there does appear to be some truth there. Various Iraqi guerrilla groups have claimed that they get assistance in one way or another from Syria. MA claims they get money from Syria. Whether he meant the Syrian state or non-state actors in Syria is not known. The Martyr Khattab Brigade of foreign fighters claims to have a training camp in Syria. A cell in Baghdad claimed that Syrian intelligence operates in Iraq, but was unclear on their exact role.

Another group in Baghdad said they got weapons from Syria. They did not specify whether the weapons came from the state or non-state actors. Apparently, fighters and weapons are still able to cross various borders, including the Syrian border, into Iraq to help the insurgency. For a long time, the Syrians were not only doing little to stop the cross-border traffic in fighters and money into Iraq, most of which was being run by local Bedouin tribesmen, but they were possibly even helping these Bedouins run the traffic. More recently, the official support from the Syrian regime seems to have been dramatically reduced or even ended, but the Syrian hands-off attitude is little changed.

The official Syrian security presence at the border has been beefed up and makes some cursory efforts at stopping traffic, but reports indicate that they are easily bribed into looking the other way. The Syrian state does not seem to be actively involved in the cross-traffic anymore, but they do not appear to be doing much to stop it either. There seems to be a “look the other way” attitude in place instead. Fighters, weapons and money come from Syria, but the available evidence suggests it is non-Syrian state actors (possibly the local Bedouin tribes or the insurgent groups themselves), not Syrian state actors, who are running the weapons and men across.

In 1-04, reports indicated that much of Syria’s northeast border area with Iraq had become something of an open-air arms market. The arms traffic was going across the Ninewa Province border with few difficulties. In addition to guerrillas, pro-Coalition Kurdish forces in northern Iraq such as the PUK were amongst the customers. As of 2-04, guerrillas in Baghdad continued to report significant quantities of weaponry being smuggled over the Syrian border and into Baghdad.

There have been numerous reports of Syrian fighters fighting in Iraq long after the fall of Baghdad. They seem to be especially notable around the Fallujah-Amiriyah-Ramadi region and over by the Qaim-Husaybah border region. Guerrillas in the Qaim area reported in late 2003 that there were a significant number of Syrians fighting in the insurgency there. In December 2003, a Syrian woman was arrested in Basra with bomb parts as part of a conspiracy to bomb the port there.

Most recently, in 5-04, an AP reporter encountered a force of hardline Syrian jihadis in the Jolan District of Fallujah after the US withdrawal. They were extremely hardline Sunni Islamists reminiscent of the most hardline Syrian Muslim Brotherhood elements.

In late 2003, guerrillas reported that Syrian students in Baghdad seemed to have suspiciously large amounts of cash on them, and that a number of these students, along with other foreign students similarly awash with suspicious cash, were supporting the insurgency financially. No one seemed to know where the Syrian students’ cash came from or that of the other foreign students, for that matter.

So far, ~200 Syrians have been arrested so far on charges of insurgency in Iraq. Clearly, Syrians and other foreign fighters are fighting in Iraq. I estimate the size of this group as no more than 3-5% of the total insurgency. Clearly, men and weapons come over the Jordanian, Syrian, Kuwaiti, Saudi and Iranian borders into Iraq. At the moment, there is little to implicate the Syrian state in this traffic other than that they do not seem to be doing a lot to stop the traffic. One may indeed argue, why should they? A strong case could be made that this is a US problem. Policing the Iraq-Syria border for unwanted traffic is the responsibility of the US.

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An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance – Size of the Resistance

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for “An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance” a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here . Note that this material is copyrighted and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and just false analysis but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get sort of a “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can kind of sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece. Here is the piece in its entirety:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE: The First Year, March 2003-May 2004

ROBERT LINDSAY

SIZE OF THE RESISTANCE

The overall size of Iraqi resistance is a subject of great controversy. The US military puts the figure at 5,000 fighters and declining. A secret CIA report listed the size at either 15,000 or 50,000, apparently, the 15,000 figure referred to actual fighters while the 50,000 figure referred to active supporters. The Iraqi resistance themselves gave a figure of 75,000-100,000 actual fighters in early 2004, but many of these are probably just part-time militia. By April 2004, with the major Fallujah-Sadr Uprising rocking Iraq, reports indicated major growth in the resistance. It would appear that the high-end figure of 100,000 would be a good minimal figure to use in light of this explosive growth.

There may be up to 20,000 fighters each in Mosul and Fallujah alone, or a total of 40,000 in the 2 cities. Further, US troops recently arrested 20,000 suspected guerrillas in Baqubah alone in a mass sweep. These high figures lend credibility to the Iraqi resistance figures for the size of the resistance. Presently, we tentatively conclude that there are at least 100,000 active fighters in the resistance, and many more active supporters. Indeed, the 100,000 figure may be a considerable underestimate.

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An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance – Structure of the Resistance

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for “An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance” a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here . Note that this material is copyrighted and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and just false analysis but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get sort of a “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can kind of sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE: The First Year, March 2003-May 2004

ROBERT LINDSAY

*****

STRUCTURE OF THE RESISTANCE

Many fighters at the cadre or cell level have only the most vague notions about the leadership of their group or how their group is funded; in fact, many seem to have no idea who the actual leadership of their group is. Baath Party members made up 30% of guerrilla cadre in 1-04 but probably much less since the Mahdi Uprising.

Before Saddam’s capture, Saddam loyalists were quite prevalent at the higher levels of the resistance, including command and control, recruitment, planning, weapons procurement, funding and logistics, but they were not so prevalent in terms of actual armed combatants. After Saddam’s capture, the top-level leadership of the resistance has become much more murky, and the pro-Saddam element is in disarray. By 11-03, Iraqi resistance fighters were often fighting outside their home area as a precautionary measure.

Presently, the structure of the typical Iraqi resistance cell is eclectic indeed. Fighters simply form cells in their home district, made up of all of those fighters who wish to fight in the area. In some places, especially with the Islamic resistance, prospective fighters are vetted and trained before being accepted into fighting units, and a number of prospective fighters are rejected.

In a typical area, the fighting unit will often be made up of former regime members, nationalists, Sunni and/or Shia Islamists, Baathists, and even Communists and Leftists. The commander of that particular cell will simply be whoever has the most military experience; this individual could well be a Baathist, former regime member, nationalist, Sunni or Shia Islamist, or even a Leftist. Fighters simply aggregate together and typically do not discuss or deal with ideology or differences. The fact that many cells are made up of fighters of widely disparate ideology does not seem to be causing many problems.

Certain types of guerrilla groups such as some of the foreign fighters, may be ideologically inclined; for instance, there are foreign fighters who are fundamentalist Islamist extremists. They often with to maintain ideological purity within their unit, however, even these fighters, with their extreme ideology, have been known to collaborate well with Iraqi Islamists, nationalists, Baathists, and former regime members. The fact that such pragmatism and flexibility has developed amongst the guerrillas so rapidly is stunning in light of common, apparently false, stereotypes about the rigidity and tribalism of Arabs.

There has been little or no infighting between guerrilla units, another commendable feature from a military standpoint. Many insurgencies have seen their fire sapped by continuous infighting and purges amongst various guerrilla factions.

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An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance – Motivations of Fighters

I have decided to publish my most recent work, An Analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, on my blog. Previously, this piece was used for the research for “An Insiders Look at the Iraqi Resistance” a major piece that appeared on the Islamist website Jihadunspun.com (JUS got the copyright but I did the research). That long-running top-billed piece is now down, but it is still archived on Alexa here . Note that this material is copyrighted and all reproduction for profit is forbidden under copyright laws.

For information about reprinting or purchasing one-time rights to this work, email me. This article is an in-depth analysis of the Iraqi resistance and is continuously being revised. It is presently 58 pages long. It lists all known Iraqi resistance groups who have ever fought in Iraq since the fall of Baghdad and includes a brief description and analysis of each group. There are separate sections covering Size, Tendencies, Motivations, Structure, Foreign Assistance, Foreign Fighters, Regional Characteristics, Regions, Cities or Towns Controlled by the Resistance, Major Attacks and List of Groups by Tendency.

The article was intended to be a political science-type analysis of the Iraqi Resistance, and I tried not to take sides one way or the other. I used a tremendous amount of source material, mostly publicly available news reports from the Internet. Obviously, in an area like this you are dealing with a ton of disinformation along with the real deal, so I spent a lot of time trying to sort out the disinfo from the relative truth.

The problem is that one cannot simply discount sources of information such as Israeli and US intelligence, US military reports, reporting from the resistance itself, Islamist websites, etc. Of course these sources are loaded with disinfo and just false analysis but they also tend to have a lot of truth mixed in as well. In writing a piece like this, you pull together all the sources and get sort of a “Gestalt” view of the situation. When you examine all the sources at once in toto, you can kind of sort out the disinfo from the more factual material. Admittedly it’s a hit or miss game but that’s about as good as we can do source-wise in the inherently hazy subject area of an underground guerrilla war.

Interviews with resistance cadre by the mainstream Western media were given particular prominence in this piece. Here is the piece in its entirety:

AN ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI RESISTANCE: The First Year, March 2003-May 2004

ROBERT LINDSAY

*****

MOTIVATIONS OF FIGHTERS

*****

Presently, almost all resistance fighters in Iraq (90%+) are motivated by the Islamic religion or Iraqi nationalism, not support for Saddam or his regime. Indeed, presently, Saddam loyalists seem to have faded to only a very small section of the resistance. The ideology of many of the fighters is described as “post-Saddam” and is a simple combination of nationalism (often with Sunni chauvinist overtones) and Sunni Islamism (ranging from nominal Muslims to hard line fundamentalists) – they feel that the US Occupation is an assault on both Islam and the entire Arab World, and therefore must be resisted.

Unfortunately, the Sunni chauvinist strain amongst the Iraqi resistance is strong and cannot be discounted – much of the resistance fears the emerging US-Shia alliance in Iraq that would break their historic domination of the country. In 2-04, Baathists still made up 30% of the resistance, but, especially after Saddam’s capture, most, if not all, of them had renounced their association with and loyalty to Saddam and his regime and were instead fighting for either Islamism or nationalism. Prior to Saddam’s capture, many former regime loyalists openly spoke of their desire to return Saddam and his regime to power.

The capture of Saddam seems to have been a powerful blow to the Saddam loyalist faction, and since his capture, fewer and fewer former Saddam loyalists still wanted to return the regime to power. Clearly, with Saddam in a US prison power and facing an Iraqi trial and possible death sentence, returning Saddam himself to power is quite a dubious proposition. Many other fighters are motivated by simple revenge for violations, slights, attacks, killings, injuries, insults, property destruction and thefts committed by US troops. In Iraqi tribal culture, such attacks mandate either a payment or an apology by the perpetrator; if that is not forthcoming, relatives of the aggrieved party are mandated to revenge the crime.

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